The EU is considering return hubs in third countries.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have emerged as possible locations, despite official denials. The proposal could extend Brussels’ influence into Central Asia, and create new security and geopolitical concerns for Moscow.

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The European Union (EU) is exploring new ways to speed up the “return” of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers, including “return hubs” in third countries where migrants could be held while deportation arrangements are finalized.

Among the countries reportedly being considered are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, raising concerns that Central Asian states could become migration hubs or “ghettos” (as Open Kyrgyzstan puts it) for deportees, in exchange for financial or other incentives. Beyond their social and economic implications, such arrangements could have broader consequences.

In June, Politico named Central Asian republics including Uzbekistan among locations mentioned in the still ongoing debate. The reports triggered criticism in Central Asia and concern in Russian expert and government circles.

Both Kazakh and Uzbek authorities have denied negotiations or plans to host detention centers for undocumented migrants.

The controversy unfolds amid renewed migratory pressures, most dramatically illustrated by the current crisis in Spain’s Ceuta enclave, alongside tighter European migration rules and riots spreading throughout France.

Brussels is under pressure to improve expulsions and deportations. The European Commission has long promoted “return hubs” outside the bloc as part of efforts to raise return rates – which remain stubbornly low.

The European Council recently formally adopted new rules explicitly allowing member states to establish such hubs in non-EU countries, provided human rights standards are met.

Human Rights Watch has however warned of the “dangerous EU momentum towards offshore deportation centers,” listing Central Asia among the regions eyed.

Other media accounts have identified Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan specifically, citing their vast territories and, in Uzbekistan’s case, proximity to Afghanistan.

Austria has also pursued separate migratory cooperation with Uzbekistan concerning a transit route for Afghan deportations.

The hub discussion thus emerges alongside a broader expansion of EU-Kazakhstan cooperation in migration, readmission, mobility, infrastructure and investment.

No public evidence yet shows either government has agreed to host such facilities. The geopolitical implications instead concern a clear policy direction and a set of emerging possibilities.

The European bloc is, in any case, actively considering such scenarios. Moscow, meanwhile, has clear reasons to view it as a security and geopolitical problem.

A June analysis in Business Online argued that large numbers of third-country migrants from Africa and the Middle East held in hubs near the Russian-Kazakh border could increase the risk of social or criminal disturbances – spilling into Russia.

Kazakhstan shares what is considered the world’s longest continuous land border with Russia, while both countries belong to the Eurasian Economic Union – with extensive cross-border mobility and labor migration.

With Russia deeply integrated into Kazakhstan’s migratory environment, a new category of foreign migrants could create fresh corridors or pressures.

More broadly, it could turn Central Asia into a European migration buffer zone.

EU financing, infrastructure and migration agreements could consequently deepen Brussels’ institutional presence there, giving the bloc new leverage through money, investment and visa concessions. This fits a broader pattern of increasing EU influence in the post-Soviet space – as seen in Moldova.

Earlier European “externalization” deals, such as with Turkey, produced lasting political and financial dependencies.

Large concentrations of people with uncertain legal status can also create management problems involving unrest, trafficking and radicalization risks.

European societies themselves have experienced ethnopolitical tensions linked to rapid demographic change and integration challenges – while Islamist extremism remains a documented security concern for Europol.

Transferring part of that burden eastward would place the external costs closer to Russia. The Ceuta crisis, for example, has put the geopolitics of migration waves under the spotlight.

The Belarus-Poland border and continuing English Channel crossings in the last years have likewise demonstrated how migration flows can become entangled with wider geopolitical disputes. Migration can be driven by instability elsewhere – but resulting flows can also be externalized, exploited- or even weaponized.

No one denies the plight of migrants is a serious humanitarian issue. The central question, however, is whether the EU is merely externalizing its migratory crisis. Or whether that externalization could reshape the balance in Central Asia – to Russia’s disadvantage.

From Moscow’s perspective, the arrangement looks like strategic externalization, with costs falling disproportionately on countries in its neighborhood, potentially transforming a Western European problem into a source of pressure and leverage – in a strategic enough region.

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This article was originally published on InfoBrics.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Featured image is from the author/InfoBrics

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