The fundamental issue is no longer simply whether the world can produce enough food, but whether food, fertilizer, and energy can be delivered to the regions where they are needed.

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Global food security entered a new and extremely fragile period in August 2026. As in previous periods, agricultural production, rainfall levels, arable land, population growth, and grain stocks have not lost their importance for food security, but they are no longer sufficient on their own.

Other categories must also be considered. Modern agriculture depends on fertilizers, fertilizers on energy, production on transportation, exports on ports, ports on sea routes, and alternative transportation corridors on railways and river discharge levels.

Developments in the summer of 2026 across a vast geography extending from the Strait of Hormuz to the Black Sea, and from the Panama Canal to the Danube and the Rhine, demonstrate that these seemingly independent elements are in fact links in the same global security chain. War, extreme heat, drought, low river levels, energy costs, vulnerabilities in fertilizer supply, and the approaching effects of El Nino are converging at the same time. Therefore, the issue we now face is no longer merely rising food prices, but the danger that simultaneous disruptions at different points in the global food system could amplify one another.

Europe’s Lifelines Are Drying Up

The extreme heat and drought that gripped Europe in the summer of 2026 created severe hydrological stress on the continent’s most important inland waterways. The most striking example occurred on the Rhine River. At the critical Kaub gauging station, west of the German city of Wiesbaden, the water level fell to 24 centimeters on August 3, reaching its lowest level since measurements began in 1880. It should be noted that the 24-centimeter reading does not represent the river’s actual physical depth, but rather the reference water level used for navigation. However, the economic consequences remain the same. As water levels fall, the usable draft of vessels decreases, barges cannot carry full loads, more voyages are required to transport the same amount of cargo, and freight costs rise. The Rhine is not an ordinary European river. It is one of the continent’s main economic inland waterway arteries, connecting major ports such as Rotterdam and Antwerp with Germany’s industrial centers, Switzerland, and Central Europe. The decline in Rhine water levels therefore affects not only river transport but also the logistics of energy, chemicals, coal, petroleum products, and raw materials for European industry.

The hydrological pressure experienced on the Rhine is producing an even more geopolitical consequence on the Danube River. This is because, following the Russia-Ukraine War, the Danube is no longer merely one of Europe’s major inland waterways. It has also become a strategic alternative corridor for transporting Ukrainian grain to the Black Sea and from there to world markets. As Russian attacks put pressure on ports, terminals, and logistics infrastructure in and around Odesa, a significant portion of Ukrainian grain was redirected to the Danube through Reni and Izmail. From there, the grain was transported downstream by barges and shipped to world markets through Romania’s Port of Constanța. In this way, Constanța effectively became a second Black Sea gateway for Ukraine after the war began.

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The Danube discharges into the Black Sea (the upper body of water in the image). (Public Domain)

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However, for this alternative system to function, the Danube must have sufficient water levels. As extreme temperatures and low rainfall reduced river levels in the summer of 2026, the draft available to barges decreased, the amount of grain that could be transported declined, and the number of voyages and freight costs increased. Thus, the war risk in the Black Sea and the climate risk in Europe are converging on the same logistics system. While Russian pressure in the Black Sea pushes Ukraine toward the Danube, drought is reducing the Danube’s transport capacity. This creates a classic double bottleneck. If the Black Sea is unsafe, traffic shifts toward the Danube; but if the Danube does not have sufficient water, the remaining alternatives are rail and road transport.

The decline in reservoir levels also demonstrates that the hydrological pressure extending from western to eastern Europe is neither temporary nor local. Therefore, the issue today is not simply the decline in water levels in the Rhine or the Danube. It is the fact that the water system supporting Europe’s transportation, agriculture, industry, and energy infrastructure is coming under pressure simultaneously across a vast geographical area.

When Water Declines, Energy Supply Tightens as Well

The strategic impact of drought is not limited to ships being able to carry less cargo. Thermal and nuclear power plants in Europe require large amounts of cooling water in their electricity generation processes. When both the volume of water in rivers decreases and water temperatures rise, power plants face pressure from two directions. On the one hand, access to sufficient cooling water becomes more difficult; on the other, the water discharged back into the river may exceed environmental temperature limits, potentially requiring power generation to be reduced.

On July 30, 2026, Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar stated that the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, which supplies approximately half of the country’s electricity, might have to be shut down completely because the Danube had fallen to historically low levels. While some units at the plant were taken offline, output at others was significantly reduced. A similar and even more severe situation emerged in Romania. Reactor 1 at the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant, which uses Danube water for cooling, was shut down in a controlled manner on July 28, followed by the second reactor on August 13, leaving Romania’s only nuclear power plant completely offline.

The drought on the Danube thus developed into a strategic crisis capable of simultaneously affecting river transport, industrial logistics, and electricity generation. In other words, the same climate event is affecting both transportation capacity and energy production. This has major implications for food security. Modern agriculture is an energy-intensive activity. Energy is used at almost every stage of the food system, from fertilizer production and irrigation to tractors, storage, the cold chain, and port operations. Therefore, drought not only reduces agricultural output in the fields but also increases the cost of producing, storing, and transporting that output.

The Grain War in the Black Sea Is Deepening

The significance of the war-and-drought bottleneck increased further with developments occurring simultaneously on both shores of the Black Sea in August. In July alone, Ukraine attacked 116 Russian vessels operating in the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait, and the Don River basin. Two major terminals for Russian grain exports in Novorossiysk were struck and forced to suspend operations. The Novorossiysk Grain Terminal, owned by Demetra Holding, had an annual capacity of approximately 8.5 million tons, while the NKHP terminal had a capacity of 7.1 million tons. Thus, a total theoretical grain export capacity of 15.6 million tons per year was temporarily taken offline. Following the attack, Russia began redirecting grain flows to alternative ports and routes. However, logistical congestion along the Azov-Don corridor is no longer a temporary problem but has become structural in nature. Moscow’s preparation of an approximately 10-billion-ruble support package to transfer grain and other cargo from Azov ports by rail to other Black Sea, Baltic, and Far Eastern ports demonstrates how pressure on maritime transportation is spreading to land infrastructure.

The situation on the Ukrainian side is no different. As a result of Russian attacks, Ukrainian grain shipments during the first two weeks of August reportedly fell by 76 percent compared with the same period last year. In response, Ukraine and Moldova began developing alternative corridors through which grain would be transported by rail via Moldova to Romania and the Port of Constanța. The capacity under discussion is 4.5 million tons per year, roughly 10 percent of Ukraine’s total grain exports. However, it is precisely at this point that the problem of low water levels on the Danube emerges.

Therefore, it is no longer only Ukraine’s grain exports that are under pressure in the Black Sea, Russian grain exports are now facing pressure at the same time. Russia is confronting serious bottlenecks in Azov and Novorossiysk, while Ukraine is facing similar constraints on the Danube and at its Black Sea ports. As both sides increasingly attempt to shift cargo to railways and alternative ports, the approximately 3 percent rise in Chicago wheat prices following the Novorossiysk attack was an important indication that military developments in the Black Sea are beginning to have a direct impact on global grain markets. If Europe’s low river levels and problems affecting Danube transportation are added to this picture, the issue could move far beyond a regional logistics disruption and create a new wave of pressure on global grain prices and food security.

Indeed, the effects of the escalating maritime trade war in the Black Sea are now being clearly felt in the diplomatic sphere as well. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, during a conversation with Egyptian President Sisi, warned that Russian attacks on merchant vessels in the Black Sea could lead to serious disruptions in food shipments. Pointing out that Ukraine is one of the major suppliers of grain and food not only to Egypt but also to numerous countries in Africa and the Middle East, Zelenskyy stated that shipments had already declined significantly and that, if this continued, serious consequences such as price increases and food shortages could emerge. Thus, the maritime trade war in the Black Sea is no longer merely an extension of the military struggle between Russia and Ukraine, through its cascading effects extending from grain export ports to the Danube and Europe’s inland waterways, and from there to food supplies in Africa and the Middle East, it is developing into a new crisis that directly threatens global food security.

More importantly, there are no strong indications that tensions in the Black Sea will ease in the near term. Ukraine reportedly proposed, through Türkiye, a mutual halt to attacks on civilian vessels in the Black Sea. Such an arrangement could effectively have paved the way for a new secure grain corridor. Moscow, however, rejected the proposal. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova described Ukraine’s attacks on commercial shipping as a policy aimed at “destabilizing civilian maritime transport” and stated that Moscow saw no grounds for “half-measures” that would give Kyiv a temporary respite.

In short, maritime security, water scarcity, energy, fertilizers, transportation, and food security are becoming interconnected links in the same chain. If several links in this chain break simultaneously, the consequences could extend from higher prices to actual food shortages, particularly in import-dependent regions such as Africa and the Middle East.

Ultimately, two of the world’s most important grain exporters are unable to access global markets at full capacity because of the same war. When the sharp decline in Ukraine’s export capacity is considered alongside attacks on Russian ports and vessels, the issue ceases to be merely an economic loss for the two belligerents and becomes a global food security problem.

This situation is particularly important for North Africa, the Middle East, and low-income countries. A reduction of several million tons in grain trade may mean higher prices for wealthy countries, but for states highly dependent on food imports, the same development could create risks of social and political instability.

Land Transport Cannot Replace Maritime Transport

Here we encounter the fundamental physical and logistical realities of global trade. It is not easy to replace the carrying capacity of maritime transport, which is seven times cheaper than land transport, with overland transportation. This is particularly important for commodities such as grain, which have a relatively low unit value but must be transported in very large volumes. Consider a medium-sized Panamax bulk carrier carrying approximately 60,000 tons of grain. Assuming that a truck in Europe carries a payload of approximately 25 tons, transporting the cargo of a single ship by road would require around 2,400 trucks. When customs delays at border crossings, fuel consumption, road capacity, traffic, and the return of empty vehicles are added to the equation, it becomes easier to understand why maritime transport is indispensable.

Although rail transport is far more efficient than road transport, serious capacity and infrastructure problems also arise here. If the cargo carried by 2,400 trucks were transferred to freight wagons, approximately 1,000 wagons would be required. Ukraine’s longest freight trains consist of 50–60 freight wagons. This would mean operating 15–20 freight trains simultaneously, a capacity that Ukraine does not possess.

On the other hand, while most of Ukraine’s railway network uses the 1,520-millimeter track gauge inherited from the Soviet system, most of Europe uses the standard 1,435-millimeter gauge. Although Ukraine has begun developing more EU-standard railway lines in recent years, this difference remains a major bottleneck requiring cargo transshipment and other technical solutions at border crossings. This is compounded by limitations in wagon, locomotive, terminal, and border capacity. Indeed, as of August 2026, the annual capacity of the new railway corridor being developed between Ukraine and Moldova, which is planned to reach the Port of Constanța via Romania, is estimated at approximately 4.5 million tons. This represents only about 10 percent of Ukraine’s total grain exports. European Commission data also show that, as of June 2026, approximately 90 percent of Ukraine’s exports of grain, oilseeds, and related products were still transported through the Black Sea. Therefore, although the idea that “if the Black Sea is closed, we can transport the grain by rail” may be theoretically possible, it is not sufficient in practice when very large volumes are involved. Road and rail transport can support maritime shipping and compensate for part of the losses, but they cannot fully replace the scale provided by Black Sea ports.

El Nino Enters the Equation

On top of all this, the world is preparing for the effects of a new El Nino period. However, caution is required here. It would not be correct to attribute the drought experienced in Europe in the summer of 2026 to El Nino. Hydrological stress in Europe began before the global effects of El Nino had fully emerged. However, El Nino, which began in late spring 2026, represents a new risk factor that could spread existing vulnerabilities to other agricultural regions of the world in the period ahead. Although El Nino does not produce the same effects everywhere, it can increase rainfall in some regions while raising the risk of drought and extreme heat in others. Therefore, different production problems could emerge simultaneously across regions producing key commodities such as wheat, corn, rice, soybeans, sugar, palm oil, coffee, and cocoa.

Another critical waterway crisis related to El Nino can be said to be emerging in Panama. As of August 15, 2026, although conditions in the Panama Canal have not reached the severity of the 2023–2024 crisis, water-related pressure is once again increasing. As the water level of Gatun Lake declines due to El Nino-related drought, the maximum draft for Neo-Panamax vessels has been reduced from 15.24 meters to 14.78 meters. This forces ships to carry less cargo. Combined with the Hormuz crisis redirecting energy traffic between Asia and the U.S. Gulf Coast toward Panama, this has resulted in queues of more than 100 vessels waiting to transit and delays of up to 10 days. Thus, drought in Panama and the effects of the war in the Strait of Hormuz are combining to place another critical chokepoint of global maritime trade under pressure.

Hormuz Is Not Just an Oil Chokepoint

Image: Strait of Hormuz (Public Domain)

One of the most critical links in this global equation is perhaps the Strait of Hormuz. When Hormuz is mentioned, oil and LNG naturally come to mind. The Persian Gulf is one of the centers of the global energy system. However, Hormuz has another strategic function for global food security that is as important as oil. The Persian Gulf countries occupy an extremely important position in global ammonia and urea trade. The Gulf is also one of the major production centers for energy and other raw materials required by the fertilizer industry. Modern industrial agriculture is heavily dependent on nitrogen fertilizers. One of the main inputs in nitrogen fertilizer production is natural gas. Hydrogen is produced from natural gas, ammonia from hydrogen, and key nitrogen fertilizers such as urea from ammonia. In simplified terms, the chain is natural gas–ammonia–urea–agricultural productivity. Gulf producers dependent on Hormuz account for approximately 34 percent of global urea trade, 23 percent of ammonia trade, 49 percent of sulfur trade, and 18 percent of MAP-DAP phosphate fertilizer trade. In 2024 alone, approximately 18.5 million tons of urea reached global markets through Hormuz. The Gulf countries’ share of global nitrogen fertilizer exports is approximately 25 percent. Therefore, a prolonged disruption in the Strait would directly affect the supply of urea and ammonia, and indirectly affect phosphate fertilizer production through sulfur, beyond its impact on energy prices. Ultimately, fertilizer prices and farmers’ costs would rise, agricultural productivity would come under pressure, and the effects would be reflected in food prices with a delay of several months.

For this reason, a serious disruption in the Strait not only raises oil and LNG prices but also increases fertilizer costs. Unlike an oil crisis, however, its impact emerges with a delay. When oil supplies are disrupted, the price impact is visible almost immediately. With fertilizers, the main consequences may emerge in the fields months later. Fertilizer becomes more expensive, farmers’ production costs rise, particularly in low-income countries farmers use less fertilizer, yields per hectare decline, and the next harvest may be smaller. Therefore, a crisis occurring in Hormuz today could actually affect next year’s food production. For this reason, Hormuz is no longer merely a strategic chokepoint for energy security, but also for global food security.

From Hormuz to the Black Sea: The Same Security Chain

When we look at the bigger picture, it becomes clear that regions seemingly thousands of kilometers apart are actually parts of the same system. Hormuz brings a significant portion of the energy and fertilizer inputs required for agricultural production to global markets. The Black Sea carries grain from Russia, Ukraine, and other producers in the region to world markets. The Danube becomes an alternative transportation corridor when war or security problems emerge in the Black Sea. The Rhine, meanwhile, constitutes one of the main arteries of Europe’s industrial, energy, and inland logistics system. When the Panama and Suez Canals and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait are added to this system, it becomes even clearer how strongly global food security depends on seas, straits, and inland waterways.

The main danger is not the closure of any single corridor. The modern system can absorb individual crises to a certain extent by creating alternative routes. The danger arises when several corridors lose capacity simultaneously. When there is war in the Black Sea, cargo shifts to the Danube. When the Danube dries up, cargo is redirected to railways. When railway capacity proves insufficient, the burden shifts to road transport. When water levels on the Rhine fall, Europe’s industrial, energy, and logistics costs increase. If El Nino reduces harvests in major production regions, the volume of agricultural products available to world markets declines. If fertilizer and energy flows through Hormuz are disrupted, the effects emerge during the following harvest season. In this way, crises that appear to be independent begin to reinforce one another within the same system.

The world has experienced far more severe droughts, wars, oil crises, and agricultural production losses in the past. Therefore, it would not be accurate to describe the current situation as an inevitable global famine. Global grain stocks, the production capacity of major exporting countries, and alternative production regions provide the system with significant resilience. However, the main risk created by 2026 lies less in the scale of individual crises than in the possibility that they may converge during the same period. When high energy costs, insurance premiums, rising freight rates, and vulnerabilities in global supply chains are added to this picture, the situation becomes even more complex.

Conclusion: Food Security in the 21st Century Does Not End in the Field

In the past, when assessing a state’s food security, it was largely sufficient to look at its agricultural land, rainfall, irrigation capacity, farmers, and grain stocks. Today, all of these remain important, but they now constitute only part of the equation. In the 21st century, food security is also a matter of energy and fertilizer security, functioning ports, continuity of maritime transportation, the navigability of rivers, railway capacity, and keeping strategic straits open. It is not enough for a country to produce grain; it requires an uninterrupted system capable of delivering fertilizer to the field, the product to the port, and the ship to the global market.

For many years, the world economy was built on the assumption that energy supplies, maritime transportation, river systems, and agricultural production would operate largely without interruption. Today, that assumption is increasingly losing its validity. The closure of a port in the Black Sea, falling water levels on the Danube and Rhine, an escalating crisis in Hormuz, drought in the Panama Canal, or El Nino affecting agricultural production are no longer independent developments. Each affects a different link in the same global food chain.

Therefore, the fundamental question for the period ahead is not simply whether the world will be able to produce enough food. The real question is whether the food, fertilizer, and energy that are produced can be delivered to the regions where they are needed, at the right time, at the right cost, and in the required quantities. Developments in the summer of 2026, from Hormuz to the Black Sea and from the Danube and Rhine to Panama and Suez, clearly demonstrate this new reality. The breaking of a single link in the system may increase costs; the breaking of two links may create serious regional problems; but the simultaneous failure of several links due to war, climate, energy, and logistics could trigger a global food crisis. Food security in the 21st century will therefore no longer be determined solely by how much is produced in the field, but by whether geopolitical, logistical, and climate security can be maintained simultaneously.

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This article was originally published on Mavi Vatan.

Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM. 

He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Featured image is from the author

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