Ethiopia, a nation that nurtured aspirations for the cessation of violence following the 2022 peace accord, is gradually being drawn into the maelstrom of a ‘multi-front war’—a conflict poised to assume dimensions far more devastating than those of its predecessors. Whilst Abiy Ahmed leverages drone capabilities in an attempt to suppress opposition within the ‘grey zone’, the emergence of unanticipated alliances between erstwhile adversaries and the intervention of regional protagonists such as Eritrea and Sudan have brought the Horn of Africa to the precipice of a cataclysmic eruption. In this context, Washington’s strategic pivot—manifested in the rescission of sanctions to safeguard Red Sea security—has introduced a new layer of complexity to a crisis that is no longer merely a domestic conflict, but an escalating threat to international stability.

Introduction: From the Dream of Peace to the Reality of the ‘Grey Zone’

Ethiopia, a nation once revered as the pillar of stability in the Horn of Africa, finds itself once again on the precipice of a catastrophic conflict. Following the devastating civil war between 2020 and 2022, waged between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—a conflict that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives[1]—the international community harboured hopes that the Pretoria Agreement would signify a definitive end to the region’s nightmare of genocide and famine. However, developments in recent months, particularly since August 2026, suggest that this peace has failed to provide a durable resolution, primarily due to the mutual failure of both parties to implement the accord. Today, Ethiopia has descended into a state of quasi-war that some analysts describe as a ‘grey zone’[2]—a condition in which the demarcation between peace and war has vanished, and intermittent drone strikes have been supplanted by a multi-front confrontation with significantly more complex and regional ramifications.

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Roots of the Crisis: The Legacy of Hegemony and Marginalisation

To comprehend the resurgence of violence, one must revisit the structural shift in power that occurred in 2018. From 1991 to 2018, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) stood as the pre-eminent political force in Ethiopia, governing the nation through an ethnically-based coalition. Upon ascending to office, Abiy Ahmed marginalised this ethnic power structure under the banner of national unity and the establishment of the Prosperity Party. This strategic shift compelled the TPLF—perceiving its exclusion from the corridors of power—towards open confrontation. In 2020, these escalating tensions culminated in a full-scale civil war. During that period, Abiy Ahmed, bolstered by the support of Eritrean forces and the Amhara regional militia known as Fano, succeeded in repelling the TPLF[3]; however, this victory was achieved at the profound cost of egregious human rights violations and the systematic destruction of Tigray’s infrastructure.

One of the most critical and unresolved consequences of the initial conflict was the status of the Western and South-Western Tigray regions. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in November 2020, these territories were recognised as integral parts of the Tigray region’s official jurisdiction; however, during the course of the war, they were seized by Amhara regional forces and Fano militias. Despite the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement in November 2022, these areas remain outside the administrative control of the Tigray Regional Government to this day. The issue regarding the restoration of these territories to Tigray was never explicitly resolved within the provisions of the Pretoria accord, and this very ambiguity persists as a primary source of the profound mistrust between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government.

From the perspective of Abiy Ahmed and the federal government, however, the restructuring of power in Ethiopia was an unavoidable necessity. They maintain that the Ethiopian governance system between 1991 and 2018 was effectively grounded in the political hegemony of the TPLF, albeit exercised through the framework of a multi-ethnic coalition. By establishing the Prosperity Party and replacing the principle of ‘regional party cooperation’ with that of ‘direct citizen membership in a national party’, Abiy Ahmed asserted that his objective was not to marginalise any specific ethnic group, but rather to bolster a shared Ethiopian identity and to equalise opportunities for all ethnicities to access power. Furthermore, the federal government consistently emphasises that safeguarding Ethiopia’s territorial integrity constitutes one of the primary legal and political obligations of any federal administration in the country.[4]

Whilst the TPLF considers the outbreak of the war to be the result of mounting federal government pressure against them, the Ethiopian government emphasises that the conflict was precipitated by the party’s assault on federal military bases in the Tigray region.[5]

August 2026: The Gradual Collapse of Peace and the Inception of Drone Strikes

Tangible signs of the disintegration of peace manifested in August 2026. Whilst the people of Tigray were preparing for the Ashenda religious festival, the federal government initiated extensive drone strikes against Mekelle, the regional capital, and other southern territories. In a departure from the first war, Abiy Ahmed refrained from making a formal declaration of hostilities on national television, nor did he suspend commercial flights or internet connectivity; however, in practice, Tigray was subjected to relentless aerial bombardments. These strikes—which resulted in, among other consequences, civilian casualties—provoked renewed resistance from the leadership of the TPLF.

A Remarkable Shift in Political Alignments: The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend

One of the most intricate dimensions of the renewed conflict is the shifting nature of political alignments. During the preceding war, the Fano militias in the Amhara region served as Abiy Ahmed’s primary allies. However, following the 2022 peace accord, Fano perceived that Abiy Ahmed had betrayed their interests by ceding certain disputed territories to Tigray. Consequently, since 2023, they have initiated an insurgency against the federal government.

In September 2026, an event that had once seemed inconceivable transpired. The TPLF and Fano—two implacable foes who had been embroiled in mutual ethnic cleansing over the territories of Western Tigray—issued a joint statement alongside five other insurgent groups, notwithstanding the fact that they remained in more direct confrontation over the fate of Western Tigray than any other issue. Although ethnic rivalries and historical animosities continue to jeopardise this strategic convergence, their common objective—specifically the removal of Abiy Ahmed—has aligned them within a unified front.[6]

The Eritrean and Sudanese Variables: Regional Dimensions of the Crisis

Image: Isaias Afwerki (Source: Quirinale.it)

It appears that the Ethiopian crisis is no longer merely a domestic concern. Eritrea, under the leadership of Isaias Afwerki, has transitioned from a former ally of Abiy Ahmed into his most significant threat. Afwerki is incensed by Abiy Ahmed’s aspirations to annex parts of the Eritrean coastline to grant Ethiopia access to the Red Sea. Reports indicate that, despite formal denials, Eritrea is providing logistical support to Fano insurgents and even the TPLF.[7]

Conversely, Sudan has also become a protagonist in this evolving conflict. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), currently embroiled in a domestic civil war, accuses Abiy Ahmed of providing support to its rival, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). As a result, Sudan has opened its borders to TPLF forces, and border skirmishes between the Ethiopian and Sudanese militaries have escalated in sectors such as Shererina. These linkages underscore the potential for the confrontation to transform into a broader regional crisis.

Red Sea Geopolitics and Washington’s Strategic Pivot

In mid-September 2026, concurrently with the resurgence of hostilities in Tigray, the United States resolved to lift arms sanctions against Ethiopia and end sanctions on senior Eritrean officials. The Treasury Department announced that the national emergency had expired.[8]

Analysts contend that Washington’s decision was motivated not by the attainment of peace in Ethiopia, but rather by geopolitical imperatives in the Red Sea. In light of escalating Houthi attacks on international shipping, cooperation with Eritrea has become a strategic imperative for the United States, given its extensive coastline adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. By rescinding these sanctions, Washington effectively extended political legitimacy to one of the world’s most repressive regimes (Eritrea) in order to safeguard Red Sea security, even if such a move occurs at the cost of further instability within Ethiopia.

September 2026: Towards All-Out War

The synchronicity between the rescission of US sanctions and the escalation of insurgent offensives was remarkable. On 23 September, TPLF forces seized control of three critical airports within Tigray.[9] In response, the Ethiopian military asserted that it had neutralised hundreds of insurgents during a counter-offensive.[10] The hostilities spilled over into the Amhara and Afar regions, leading to the suspension of flights to strategic destinations, including the city of Lalibela.[11] On 25 September, the internet observatory NetBlocks reported that internet connectivity in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia had been disrupted.[12] During the Tigray War of 2020–2022, the region remained largely sequestered from the outside world, leaving hundreds of thousands of individuals in famine-like conditions.[13]

The insurgents are currently endeavouring to besiege the city of Weldiya, the fall of which could pave the way for an advance on Addis Ababa. Additionally, the threat of severing the road leading to the Port of Djibouti, which serves as Ethiopia’s economic lifeline, has placed Abiy Ahmed’s administration in a state of emergency.

Conclusion: The Horn of Africa on the Precipice

Abiy Ahmed ascended to power under the banners of unity, peace, and democratic inclusivity, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. However, his management of political dissent, the proliferation of the conflict across multiple fronts, the enduring humanitarian crisis, and the escalating reliance on aerial warfare in lieu of political discourse are the quintessential factors that have significantly eroded the legitimacy of these proclamations.

The collapse of the Pretoria Agreement is not merely a consequence of renewed historical animosities, but rather the manifestation of a convergence between three pivotal factors: the structural contradictions inherent in Ethiopian ethnic federalism, a revitalised struggle for power following its historical monopolisation, and the intervention of regional and extra-regional geopolitical interests into this rivalry. Present-day Ethiopia stands in a far more precarious position than it did in 2020. Whilst Abiy Ahmed retains air superiority and utilises sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the proliferation of active fronts and the emergence of heterogeneous alliances among insurgent groups have severely strained the military’s operational capacity. Furthermore, the intervention of external protagonists such as Eritrea and Sudan, coupled with the United States’ prioritisation of its own geopolitical imperatives, has compounded the multifaceted complexity of the crisis.

The current crisis demonstrates that peace in Ethiopia remains little more than a mirage in the absence of a radical resolution to ethnic and territorial disputes, and without due consideration for the regional balance of power in the Horn of Africa. Should international diplomacy continue to prioritise Red Sea security at the expense of Ethiopia’s internal stabilisation, the nation risks becoming the epicentre of a regional conflagration whose repercussions will extend from Sudan to Yemen.

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Amir Abbas Amirshekari is an independent researcher and an Advocate at the Iran Bar Association. He holds a Ph.D. in International Law from the University of Tehran and served as a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg (2014-2016). With years of academic teaching experience, he has published extensively across multiple languages. He can be reached at [email protected].

Notes

[1] Teklehaymanot G. Weldemichel, ‘Tigray war: Modern geographies of mass violence and the invisibilization of populations’, Political Geography, 118 (2025), 103298, p. 1, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2025.103298.

[2] ‘Tigray: Into the Gray Zone’, The Economist, September 5–11, 2026, p. 38.

[3] ‘Ethiopia: Back to Bloodshed’, The Economist, 26 September–2 October 2026, p. 41.

[4] https://www.tghat.com/2021/02/16/ethiopia-a-dirty-war-behind-closed-doors/

[5] https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/tplf-crisis-ethiopia-when-diplomatic-involvement-perceived-offensive-28846

[6] ‘Ethiopia: Back to Bloodshed’, The Economist, 26 September–2 October 2026, p. 41.

[7] ‘Tigray: Into the Gray Zone’, The Economist, September 5–11, 2026, p. 39.

[8] ‘Ethiopia: Back to Bloodshed’, The Economist, 26 September–2 October 2026, p. 41.

[9] https://www.dw.com/en/why-eritrea-matters-as-fighting-returns-to-ethiopias-tigray/a-79426582

[10] https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-tigray-tplf-fighting-war/a-79419173

[11] https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-tigray-tplf-fighting-war/a-79419173

[12] https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-internet-disrupted-in-tigray-amid-conflict-escalation/a-79424191

[13] https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-internet-disrupted-in-tigray-amid-conflict-escalation/a-79424191

Featured image: Ethiopian troops vanquish US-backed Tigray rebels (File photo)

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