Catalans are the people who live in the territories of Spain in the autonomous-historical region called Catalonia.

Their significance for Spanish inner politics can be understood best if we know that Catalonia (Catalunya) has been, since 1975, the most politically and economically powerful autonomous self-governing region in the Kingdom of Spain – during the last 25 years, basically, a kind of “a state within the state”. As a matter of fact, Catalans are the most integrated ethnohistorical group in Spain together with Basques.[1]

What makes Catalans so interlinked could be understood if we know how Catalans historically understand the concept of group identity. First of all, they identify a Catalan as “a Catalan is whoever lives and works in Catalonia”, and “a Catalan is whoever speaks Catalan.”[2] These explanations indicate that both hereditary and by converting everybody could be a Catalan; practically means that a Catalan ethnonational identity is founded on both political (French) and linguistic-cultural (German) concepts or models.[3] In short, according to the French model, ethnonation is made by all people who want to live together in a single (national) political entity (autonomous region, province or state), while, according to the German concept, persons speaking the same language, adhering to the same religion, or with the same history and culture are the people in an ethnonational sense. However, it is obvious in the Catalan case that a common culture and especially the language are creating the fundamental framework of ethnonational identity: “Nobody will be a Catalan until he speaks like us until he makes our needs his own.”[4] This indicates that a struggle is needed to get a Catalan identity, and it is believed that the people will hardly give up their already achieved identities after that effort.

It is seen that the language is the hallmark of integration in Catalonia but not the only one. People who convert to Catalan participate in a popular culture of Catalans too. This means not only the linguistic but also the traditions and habits of Catalans are imposed on the newcomers who, all together, have a sacred task of Catalan nationalism expressed as:

“Nationalism is the will to have a particular way of being and the possibility to build up one’s own country”… “Our [Catalan] identity as a country, our will to be, and our perspectives for the future depend on the preservation of our language”… “It is the task of all those who live in Catalonia to preserve its personality and strengthen its language and culture”.[5]

All the factors creating a common ethnonational identity mentioned above show that the consciousness of Catalan identity is taught to all newcomers and exercised by both old and new citizens in order to make Catalonia as strong as a political unity and Catalans as strong as an ethnonational society. In essence, cultural nationalism, as a form of nationalism that places primary emphasis on the regeneration of the nation as a distinctive civilisation rather than on self-determination, is becoming a fundamental cement of Catalan group identity. Cultural nationalism is, however, usually backed by ethnic but not civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism emphasises the organic and ethnic unity of the nation, while civic nationalism allows respect for ethnic and cultural diversity that does not challenge core civic values. In other words, Catalan ethnonational identity is based on ethnic or ethnocultural nationalism, which naturally struggles for the realisation of its basic political principle – national self-determination or the principle that the ethnonation has to be a sovereign political entity. National self-determination, therefore, implies the idea of national independence what means the creation of an independent national state. In practice, such a principle and politics based on it brought Catalonia to direct political conflict with the central authorities in Madrid and with the rest of Spain – a country which was never properly united since its foundation in 1479.  

A Factor of History

As a matter of historical fact, the Catalan region always struggled with the central government of Spain for several reasons; among them, the most important are: 

1. Catalonia was economically the most developed and industrialised region of Spain, having at the same time significant economic resources but feeling to be financially exploited by Madrid. The Catalan industrial, financial, and commercial élites identified the landowning and financial interests from Castilla and Madrid as responsible for all the ills of Spain, and from time to time the attempts to tax the profits of neutrality were resisted by Catalan industrialists as Madrid’s attack on their liberties.[6]
2. Catalans developed the highest degree of the spirit of ethnonational unity in Spain and, therefore, they always understood themselves to be spiritually superior in comparison to all other administrative-historical regions of Spain.
3. Catalonia, in fact, together with Castilla, is a founder of the state of Spain in 1479 (under the historical name of Aragón), giving to the Kingdom of Spain the king and subsequently Catalan regional autonomy; together with Catalan ethnic nationalism are seen as measures to preserve the historical identity of the region.    

We never have to forget that modern Catalonia is, in fact, a legal successor of the historical Kingdom of Aragón – a state founder, together with the Kingdom of Castilla, of the Kingdom of Spain within the legal framework of the union of Castilla and Aragón in 1479. It practically means that Catalonia included its own state-historical independence in Spain by the political marriage of the Roman Catholic monarchs, Isabel I of Castilla and Fernando II of Aragón, in 1469. Isabel I succeeded to her crown in 1474, while Fernando II did the same with his crown in 1479.[7] Nevertheless, Aragón brought to the new state, together with its mainland territory in the Iberian Peninsula, the Balearic Islands, the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, and South Italy (the Kingdom of Naples).[8] At that time, the Kingdom of Aragón was much bigger than present-day Catalonia, which was an autonomous duchy of Aragón together with the autonomous Kingdom of Valencia.[9] The Kingdom of Aragón was a federation of autonomous principalities. The titular head of the Aragonese feudal federation ruled the various member-states separately, and in each case, there was an individual contractual relationship between monarch and vassals, institutionalised by a representative chamber, Cortes, which the Catalan representatives first assembled in 1218, the Aragonese in 1247, and the Valencians in 1283. The Catalan „empire“ started to be formed when the territorial expansion southwards reached the boundaries agreed with the Kingdom of Castilla and, as a consequence, Catalonia turned her attention to territorial expansion to the Mediterranean Sea. Catalonia established a permanent presence in North Africa and intervened in the political affairs of the states on the Apennine Peninsula (later Italy). Sardinia became the first Italian victim of the Catalan expansionism, followed by Sicily and South Italy.[10] Catalan consulates were opened up from the Levant to Flanders, and two Byzantine duchies of Athens and Neopatras were incorporated into the Aragonese federation.[11] Two Catalan provinces – Cerdenya and Roussillon existed north of the Pyrenees, today in France.

With the creation of the Aragonese maritime empire, Catalan industrial exports grew tremendously in return for slaves and spices from the east. The Catalan language became the lingua franca of the Mediterranean Sea basin concerning trade, followed by Catalan trading customs becoming the first set of rules of maritime law that was finally codified as Libre del Consolat de Mar. In the mid-14th century, the golden age of Catalan mercantile and maritime expansion reached its peak, with clear, spectacular evidence of such power and economic prosperity visible in Barcelona,[12] which was the political and economic centre of the Aragonese maritime empire until the unification with Castilla into Spain, when Madrid became the epicentre of the Spanish overseas empire.    

The historical dispute between Castilla and Aragón/Catalonia over political leadership of Spain and its overseas colonies in America (since 1492) basically broke out in 1504 when Queen Isabel of Castilla died. Aragón’s representative, King Fernando, claimed that his original crown land now had to have leadership of Spain, while the aristocracy of Castilla argued that according to the political marriage in 1469 between Castilla and Aragón, the first had to be the leader, as: 

1. 1.Castilla was three times larger than the combined kingdoms of Aragón, Valencia and Mallorca and the Principality of Catalonia.
2. 2.Castilla was more heavily populated, with five million inhabitants (and taxpayers) against under a million in Aragón.
3. 3.Castilla was much richer in taxable wealth and disposable income.
4. 4.Castilla was more dynamic and expansionist, having in her hands an American colonial empire.

What was keeping Spain together since 1469 was rather the Roman Catholic Church than a common ethnic origin, which in reality never existed.[13] The fragility of Spanish common identity, followed by regional-historical separatism, was in full evidence during the Spanish Civil War of 1936−1939 when the presence of the Republican government in Barcelona from the end of 1937 caused endless friction between the centralist authority and the proponents of Catalan autonomy or even secession. While many Republicans looked upon Catalonia as a state within the state, not fully contributing to the war effort against the forces of General Franco, the Catalans felt that the central government was constantly seeking to erode their autonomy and even regional-historical identity. When Barcelona fell on January 25th, 1939, the war was nearly over – Madrid capitulated on March 28th. Spain entered the time of Roman Catholic supremacy in all spheres of life under the open dictatorship of Caudillo de España.      

In March 1939, General Francisco Franco came to the head of Spain, and he was the main political figure of the country until he died in 1975.[14] The problem of Catalonia was left to be solved, and the leading political forces of Spain were aware that Catalans were the only organised ethnic group in the country, even under Franco’s dictatorship, with Franco being very affluent in the sense of economy. The first serious strikes in Franco’s Spain occurred in Barcelona in March 1951, followed by the rest of Catalonia and some other regions. Spain did not want to lose a region which was so mobilised and rich and, therefore, the central government in Madrid had to do something special for Catalans in order not to lose them. Before General Franco’s dictatorship, Catalonia had a set of autonomous regional privileges, but with the rule of Franco, Catalans lost their autonomous status as the whole country was heavily centralised, and Catalans felt themselves to be the main losers of Franco’s military-ecclesiastic regime. Nevertheless, severe cultural and political repression in Catalonia did not destroy Catalan separate ethnonational and regional-historical identity or desire for separate status and administrative autonomy. The Catalan Church continued to foster Catalan cultural studies and set itself up as a Catalanist focus. Having Catalan example, in 1966 the Basque provinces started as well to reclaim their regional rights, which the Basques had shortly enjoyed during the Civil War.

Catalonia’s Autonomy

Catalonia regained its autonomous status in 1978, three years after Franco’s death. Despite the conditional support in Northern Spain, the constitutional charter approved in the plenary session of Congress and Senate on October 31st, 1978, ratified by the nation on December 6th and sanctioned by the King on December 27th, provided a framework of guarantees to ensure democratic coexistence within the Constitution and the laws of the country. The most novel aspect of the 1978 Constitution was the reorganisation of the Spanish administrative territory into 17 (+2) autonomous communities[15] as a semi-federal state. 

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The 2010 Catalan autonomy protest in the intersection of Passeig de Gràcia and Aragó Avenues, in Barcelona (CC BY-SA 3.0)

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A formal and legal regional autonomy of Catalonia is guaranteed by a new democratic post-Franco 1978 Constitution of Spain. This practically meant that, for the first time in Spanish history, the Catalans and Catalonia received significant ethno-regional autonomy and sovereignty, with a high degree of political and administrative rights to be exercised; in fact, Catalonia became, according to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State, a state within the state (of Spain). According to Article 1 of this Convention, the state has four features:

1. A defined territory.
2. A permanent population.
3. An effective government.
4. The capacity to enter into relations with other states.[16]

What has to be mentioned is the fact that according to this view, the political existence of the state is not dependent on its formal recognition as “independent” by other states. It means further that, according to Article 3,  the state, even without its formal recognition, has the right to defend its integrity and sovereignty, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organise itself as it sees fit. Nevertheless, the main feature of the concept of the state is sovereignty – the principle of supreme and unquestionable authority, reflected in the claim by the political unity to be the sole author of laws within its territory. What was most important the Catalans, within the constitutional framework of their sovereign autonomy, had the right to decide whether or not to accept the decisions of the central government in Madrid concerning Catalonia in the senses of economy, justice and social security, what means they had a legal power to exercise their political-regional sovereignty in competition with the central government of Spain. In short, such a kind of state within the state in the federal system of political unity is historically very rare, and this Catalan case can be in this sense compared, for instance, with the case of Kosovo’s Albanian sovereignty in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1974 to 1989, with the common conclusion: de facto political-regional independence is at an end and leads to the requirement of its formal international recognition as an independent state.[17]

Amid celebration in Catalonia’s capital, Barcelona, pre-autonomy status for this region was recognised with the re-establishment of the Generalitat. The ethno-regional sovereign privileges of Catalonia in the senses of politics and economy according to the Generalitat were:

1. Juridical Regime: The Generalitat, as the Constitution of Catalonia[18] mentions that:

“The High Court of Justice of Catalonia is the supreme jurisdictional body of the legal system in Catalonia, and it is competent, under the terms established by the corresponding organic law, to hear the appeals and cases of the different jurisdictional areas, and to protect the rights recognised in this Estatut. In all cases, the High Court of Justice of Catalonia is competent in the areas of civil, penal, contentious-administrative and social law and other areas of law which may be created in the future.”[19]

This guarantees the equal treatment of all citizens and decreases the level of conflicts derived from the lack of a central administration. Also, it gives confidence to Catalonia that it has the right to implement juridical processes about the issues of the Catalan region. Nevertheless, having a separate juridical regime makes Catalans stronger within the state of Spain.

2. Trade and Trade Fairs: 

“The Generalitat has exclusive power in matters of trade and trade fairs, including the regulation of non-international trade fair activities and the administrative planning of trading activities.”[20]

This indicates that Catalonia has the right to implement its own trade activities according to its own wishes and benefits. In practice, when this legal right concerning the hinterland of Barcelona comes together, it gets easier to increase the welfare of the region.

3. Education: 

“Determination of the educational content of the first cycle of infant education and the regulation of the centre in which this cycle is taught, and also the definition of the staffing arrangements and the qualifications and specialisations of the other staff.”[21]

This shows that Catalonia has the right to exercise the manner of education with regard to its own culture. Although it is obligatory to teach Spanish lessons in schools, Catalans are still being educated in Catalan culture. This also makes them both more integrated into Spanish society and gives a sense of a separate Catalan identity.  

4. Public Security: 

“In matters of public security, the Generalitat, in accordance with State legislation, is responsible for planning and regulating the public security system for Catalonia and organisation of the local police and public safety and public order.”[22] 

This gives the autonomous region the right to protect the welfare of its citizens. Due to the fact that the people of the region know their own problems better, providing security while being aware of the real problems makes the region stronger. 

5. Participation in the Treaties of the European Union: 

“The Generalitat shall be informed by the State Government of initiatives for review of European Union treaties and of subsequent signing and ratification processes. The Government of the Generalitat and Parliament shall address, to the State Government and to the Cortes Generales, the observations that it deems pertinent to this effect.”[23]

This indicates that although Catalonia does not have a direct influence on the European Union (the EU), the central government in Madrid still has to inform Catalonia about the issues of EU-Spanish relations. Nevertheless, this point again shows how, in fact, the Autonomous Region of Catalonia within Spain is legally powerful.

6. International Treaties and Conventions: 

“The Government of the State shall inform the Generalitat in advance of the signing of treaties which have a direct and singular effect on the powers of Catalonia. The Generalitat and Parliament may address the observations that they consider relevant to these matters to the Government.” and “In the case of treaties which have a direct and singular effect on Catalonia, the Generalitat may request that the Government include representatives of the Generalitat in the negotiating delegation; the Generalitat may request that the Government sign international treaties in areas within its jurisdiction.”[24]

This indicates a very important issue: although Catalonia is just formally an autonomous region of Spain, it has, in fact, a real right to influence Madrid about Spanish decisions in regard to Catalonia, and it has the right to challenge the decisions by the central Spanish authority.  

Catalonia Between Madrid and Brussels

The conflicts between Catalonia and the central government in Madrid are among the multiple issues in which the EU is directly involved since 1986, when Spain became a member-state of the European Community (the EC). The fundamental issues in the relations between Barcelona and Madrid are:

1. The conflict between Catalonia and Madrid was about taxing issue. Except for the Basque and Navarre regions, all the provinces pay their taxes to the central government of Spain.[25] 33% of the collected taxed was paid back to those provinces.[26] However, Catalonia demanded that 50% of the collected tax be paid back. Nevertheless, if only Catalonia were paid back 50%, there would be no problems, but the central government feared that if the other autonomous regions also demanded the same amount (50%) to be paid back of the taxes by them, then the central government of Spain would go bankrupt.[27]

2. The second problem was about the “Catalan nation.” If Catalonia is accepted as “Catalonia is a nation”, as it is accepted in the Catalan Parliament, Spain feared facing the same demands from other autonomous regions. One of Catalonia’s demands was to be recognised as a nation, and because they were not recognized so, they only had privileges; there again arose a conflict between Madrid and Catalonia. The conflicts about regional-administrative taxing and being recognised or not as a nation became the most critical political problems between Barcelona and Madrid for the very reason that if Madrid would recognise Catalonia as a nation, then this region would acquire a full legal set of rights to proclaim its state’s independence (what they already did, in fact, on October 27^th, 2017).[28]

3. Another problem is the language. The official language of Spain is Spanish (in fact, the language of Castilla), but every administrative region is allowed to speak its own language unless Spanish is not being taught. However, Catalonia does not implement the necessary 3 hours per week of Spanish language lessons at schools and, therefore, Madrid and Catalonia again have a clash because the central government fears that Catalonia can totally lose its identity as part of Spain. That is why Madrid wants the Spanish language to be taught in schools in Catalonia officially for proper Catalan integration into Spanish society. However, Catalonia, on the other hand, has a large residue of resentment and mistrust over certain features, including the language issue, symbolising the centralising and repressive tendencies of the Spanish central government. 

Catalonia is faced with the problem of both globalisation and Spain’s membership in the EU in the process of seeking the international recognition of its self-proclaimed independence. As it is quite clear, in today’s globalised world order, no state or autonomous region is able to survive without relations with other states or international organisations. Such a problem exists concerning the relation of Catalonia and the EU – a supranational organisation, which did not recognise Catalan independence declared in October 2017 but, on the other hand, the same supranational organisation which the majority of member-states recognised the self-declared independence of Kosovo in February 2008. Here, a double-standard policy of the EU is clearly applied: Brussels, concerning the Catalan case of declared independence, did not want to interfere in the internal matter of the independent and sovereign Spain but did so directly by brutally violating Serbia’s Constitution when Kosovo Albanians proclaimed their independence from Serbia.     

The EU, as the most unique supranational political structure in the world, is not willing to share its power with a non-state entity. Catalonia, under the autonomous region conditions, does not have the right to influence the EU’s politics as the central government of Spain does. This raises the problem that, although Catalonia is a powerful region, it is not accepted as an influential figure in the EU, as it is not an independent state. Due to the fact that Catalonia is a regional-administrative entity which belongs to Spain, the central government in Madrid does not accept Catalonia having the same rights as the Spanish administration in dealing with the EU. 

Catalonia Between Independence and Spain

The possibility of a proclamation of Catalonia’s formal independence became the most problematic issue of the “Catalonian Question” either for Madrid or for Brussels. It became clear over a long period of time, as happened in reality in October 2017, that, in the case of a Catalan declaration of independence, central Spanish authorities would not recognise it, but the problem was how the EU central bureaucratic apparatus (Council and Commission) would react to the Catalan right to national self-determination, including political independence: the same right which Brussels recognised in the cases of dissolutions of ex-Yugoslavia and the USSR, for instance. We have to remember that the EU (at that time the European Community) formulated in 1991 four basic principles regarding the question of delimitation between Yugoslavia’s (6) federal republics and their unilateral declarations of political independence formally based on the right to national self-determination:

1. Yugoslavia’s state (external) borders are unchangeable.
2. Inter-republican borders can be changed only by collective agreement of the republics.
3. Until the time when such agreement is reached, the former inter-republican borders are protected by international law (the principle Uti possidetis iuris).
4. Forcible change of such borders does not produce a legal effect.[29]

Nevertheless, the border issue of the Catalan independence problem did not affect the “Catalonian Question” in Madrid or Brussels differently in comparison with the case of the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia. However, the nature of Brussels reaction to those two cases was quite different, as the EU’s administration did not imply a policy of noninterference in the inner (Spanish) affairs in the case of Yugoslavia (in 1991‒1992). Moreover, the EU’s recognition of Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian anti-constitutional and unilateral separation basically fueled the civil wars in the western territories of ex-Yugoslavia. What Catalonia did in October 2017 was, in fact, the same as what Yugoslav separatists did in 1991−1992 (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and in 2008 (Kosovo). It has to be noted that Spain is one of the 5 EU’s member-state which did not recognise Kosovo’s independence; as in this case, Madrid has to do the same with Catalonian one. For Madrid, both of these two cases are illegal and unconstitutional. However, as Spain is an EU member state (since 1986), the EU’s recognition of the independence of Catalonia will surely dramatically deteriorate the relations between the EU and Spain that would not go to the benefits of Brussels. In addition, Brussels also fears that if Catalonia becomes independent, this would encourage other nationalistic movements within the EU’s countries (for example, Flemish, Scottish, Corsican, Basque, Lega Nord, Sardinian, etc.) so that such a process can disintegrate the EU.  

Catalonia has many privileges within Spain which the Catalans exercise for the good of a Catalan society. However, there are, in fact, a majority of Catalans who struggle for political independence. The question is basically whether Catalans want to have politically recognised independence or to obtain more privileges from the central government in Madrid. Concerning this issue, there is a huge diversity inside Catalan society, which is divided between those who support independence and those who are satisfied with getting more privileges. The second group has four crucial arguments not to support independence but instead to struggle for higher autonomy:

1. It is impossible to survive without having political and economic relations with other entities and without being recognised by the rest of the world. If Catalonia becomes independent, most of the states (especially the EU’s and NATO’s members) will not recognise it in order not to deteriorate their good and beneficial relations with Spain.
2. Many Catalans prefer more privileges instead of independence, as in order to get independence Catalans have to use force like the Basque nation[30] what can provoke a civil war like in ex-Yugoslavia with unpredictable consequences. It is seen that in the history of Catalans, they prefer solving problems with Madrid by using political methods, not by force. As historically they have acted according to the political rules, many Catalans are suspicious about whether Catalonia will be successful if force is going to be used. In essence, it is seen by many Catalans that more privileges are going to be more beneficial for Catalonia; in contrast, becoming recognised as an independent by some countries, especially if Spain were to introduce an economic blockade of Catalonia as a repressive measure to beat its independence.[31]
3. The central government of Spain does not want to recognise the declared independence of Catalonia what again indicates the “Yugoslav syndrome” – no independence without violence.[32] According to international law and the United Nations’ Charter, if the existing status is changed by using force and, as a consequence, a new political situation is established, no state can recognise the independence of a new political unity; otherwise, it is a violation of international law, and the states which violate it are considered as transgressors. It practically means that, in order not to be a transgressor, a majority of states would not recognise Catalan independence based on the use of force. This is an argument for the option to stay in Spain as an autonomous region and to continue to struggle for its improvement.[33]
4. On the one hand, Catalans have a strong sense of regional-historical identity, but at the same time, many Catalans do not want to lose their Iberian-Spanish identity and origin. The consciousness of belonging to a distinct community sharing the same historical background and the political desire for an autonomous region are what are desired. This indicates that many Catalans admit having a double identity and have a desire to live with both of them: Spanish and Catalan. Admitting a Spanish identity also brings the demand for services like better education, healthcare, police services, and willingness to share economic and social developments, etc., from the central government, and because they believe that they have a significant impact on Spain’s domestic affairs, Catalans are pressing for more privileges in these areas.

However, the set of privileges which are given by Madrid to Catalonia’s autonomous region is sufficient to implement the Catalan affiliation to Spain. Catalans are very closely involved in decisions about Catalonia in terms of judgment, international agreements, teaching the Catalan language, preserving Catalan culture, and some important international issues. Therefore, the crucial question is: What does Catalonia want more from Madrid instead of independence? Basically, there are two cardinal requirements concerning the improvement of Catalonia’s autonomous status as compensation for her independence:

1. Catalans want to be paid back more from the taxes that are given to Madrid, in comparison to other autonomous regions. The realisation of this requirement is, in fact, leading to the so-called “asymmetrical federation” which, for instance, Slovenia and Croatia advocated in 1990 in their relations with the rest of Yugoslavia. However, the “asymmetrical federation” is unfair as it creates first- and second class of the members of the federation, i.e., those who are more and those who are less privileged within the same political-economic system. Nevertheless, till April 2006, this Catalan demand was not met, but after the long negotiations between Madrid and Barcelona, Catalonia got the right to be paid back 50% of the collected taxes from its territory.[34] Regardless of the fact that the central government of Spain feared that all other autonomous regions could demand the same, Madrid recognised this right to Catalonia primarily due to the fact that this decision was made according to the Constitution of Spain and advantaged position of Catalonia, which other autonomous regions could not object to. Undoubtedly, this progress was very beneficial for the good of Catalonia, but because the Catalans had more demands, it became clear that it was not enough to satisfy all Catalan wishes.
2. Catalans wanted to be recognised as a nation. Like being paid back 50% of the collected taxes, during the same negotiations, this request, in fact, was accepted as well. This gave Catalans the feeling that the Generalitat is getting stronger and that Catalonia is at the same time gaining the features of a state within the state. Like taxing privilege, the recognition of Catalans as a nation was also made under the Constitution of Spain so that there were not many objections from other autonomous regions, as everything was done within the constitutional framework. Basically, only due to the fact that other autonomous regions in Spain are not as powerful as Catalonia is, they do not protest or demand the same privileges as Catalonia enjoys. Although Catalans achieved the most important desires they wished, they are still not satisfied in full because they believe that Madrid could do more for Catalonia after the 2006 negotiations, and that is, in fact, the endless political game between Madrid and Barcelona (with Catalan blackmailing of Spain). Catalans, actually, want to have as much political power as Madrid has and, in such a way, transform Spain into a dual state like it was Austria-Hungary since 1867 according to the Ausgleich.[35] If this demand is met, not in theory but in practice, Catalonia will be an independent political entity. However, that is a “red line” which Madrid cannot accept at any price, but on the other hand, if Spain recognised Catalonia and Catalans as a nation, it means that, theoretically, such an ethnic group has the right to live in its own independent state.

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Catalan President Carles Puigdemont and over 700 mayors from Catalonia meeting to support an independence referendum, September 2017 (Generalitat de Catalunya)

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Conclusions

Catalonia, with the Barcelona hinterland, is a very important economic region for Spain, which Madrid cannot separate easily as it brings a huge amount of taxes to the centre. Catalans themselves have a strong sense of both Catalan and Spanish identities, followed by successful historical experience in coping with a central authority in Madrid. Therefore, since 1978, Catalonia has enjoyed a great degree of self-administration, being seen by many experts as a state within the state.  

Although Catalonia had the right to have a voice in the issues related to Catalonia, it demanded more. At first sight, Madrid did not meet Catalonia’s demands, so problems occurred between them. Another problem occurred between Catalans and the EU, as the EU never shared its centralised power with autonomous regions, although Catalans had powerful economic resources. However, the most important reason for a strict pro-Madrid policy by Brussels is that the EU does not want to deteriorate good relations with Spain – a country that is much more important for both the EU and NATO in comparison to a separate Catalonia.

After a long time of clashes between Madrid and Brussels, a significant part of Catalan society understood that having more privileges can be more beneficial instead of getting formal political independence. Therefore, they persuaded Madrid to grant more privileges in some important aspects of national life, but still, Catalonia demands more, as Barcelona wants to be as powerful as Madrid. Since Catalans are being recognised as a nation and they are being paid back 50% of the taxes, other autonomous regions are not happy with that, but because all decisions about Catalan privileges between Madrid and Barcelona are justified by the Constitution, other autonomous regions are, up to now, staying silent. However, dealing with the “Catalonian Question” within Spain, which is going to be an endless political game, the central government in Madrid should be careful in order not to face serious problems inside the country on relations with other autonomous regions. Finally, as the 2017 case clearly shows, Catalonia can get independence only if some global great power(s) will directly support Catalan secessionism.

Finally, at least from Madrid’s point of view, to solve the “Catalonian Question,” probably the optimal solution that historical lands of Castilla would proclaim their own political independence from Catalonia – Castilla, nevertheless, was one of the two founding independent states (kingdoms) of Spain in 1479.

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Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirović is a former university professor in Vilnius, Lithuania. He is a Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Notes

[1] On Basques, see in [Roger Collins, The Basques, Hoboken, Second Edition, New Jersey: Blackwell Pub, 1990; R. L. Trask, The History of Basque, New York: Routledge, 1997; Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History of the World, New York: Penguin Books, 1999; M. Bryce Ternet, A Basque Story, Second Edition, Scotts Valley, California: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2009]. 

[2] Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans and Spain, Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2000, 214−215.

[3] On the concepts or models of ethnonational identity, see in [Montserrat Guibernau, John Rex (eds.), The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997].

[4] Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans and Spain, Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2000, 215.

[5] Pujol J., Construir Catalunya, Barcelona: Pórtic, 1980, 22, 35−36. Compare with: “If you cannot speak Welsh, you carry the mark of the Englishman with you every day. That is the unpleasant truth” [The Guardian, November 12th, 1990, 1].  

[6] Juan Lalaguna, A Traveller’s History of Spain, Fifth Edition, London: Phoenix, 2003, 164.

[7] There is a dispute among historians which year is to be taken as the official year of the creation of the Kingdom of Spain: 1469 or 1479. The proponents of the first option are taking into consideration the year of the marriage between Isabel and Fernando (1469) [Dragoljub R. Živojinović, Uspon Evrope 1450−1789, Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1985, 93] while the others are taking into account the year when the last of them (Fernando) succeeded the crown (1479) [Dr Alan Isaacs et al (eds.), A Dictionary of World History, Reprinted with corrections, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 590]. 

[8] Dragoljub R. Živojinović, Uspon Evrope 1450−1789, Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1985, 93.

[9] Josef Engel (Redaktion), Großer Historischer Weltatlas. Zweiter Teil. Mittelalter, München: Bayerischer Schulbuch-Verlag, 1979, 78−79.

[10] A language spoken today in Sardinia is a mixture of the Catalan and Italian. However, the Italians from the mainland cannot understand the Sardinian language. About the history of Sardinia, see in [Luciano Gallinari (ed.), Sardinia from the Middle Ages to Contemporaneity, Bern: Peter Lang, 2018].

[11] Flocel Sabaté (ed.), The Crown of Aragon: A Singular Mediterranean Empire, Leiden: BRILL, 2017.

[12] For instance, the Cathedral, the Church of Santa María del Mar, Consell de Cent, Llotja, the palace of Generalitat, Reales Atarazanas, etc.

[13] A name of Spain is derived from the name of the Roman province of Hispania.

[14] Anita Inder Singh, Democracy, Ethnic Diversity and Security in Post-Communist Europe, New York: Praeger Publishers, 2001, 42.  

[15] Juan Lalaguna, A Traveller’s History of Spain, Fifth Edition, London: Phoenix, 2003, 224−227.

[16] Andrew Heywood, Global Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 112.

[17] Concerning the Kosovo case, see in [Hannes Hofbauer, Experiment Kosovo: Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus, Wien: Promedia Druck- und Verlagsges. m.b.h., 2008; Pierre Pean, Sébastien Fontenelle, Kosovo: Une Guerre „Juste“ pour Créer un Etat Mafieux, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2013].

[18] Scott L. Greer, Nationalism and Self-Government the politics of Autonomy in Scotland and Catalonia, New York: State University of New York, 2008, 107.

[19] Generalitat. Article 95 [http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_3.htm#a95].  

[20] Generalitat. Article 121 [http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_4.htm#a121].  

[21] Generalitat.  Article 131 [http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_4.htm#a131].  

[22] Generalitat. Article 164 [http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_4.htm#a164]. 

[23] Generalitat. Article 185 [http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_5.htm#a185]. 

[24] Generalitat. Article 196 [http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_5.htm#a196]. 

[25] İspanya Çatırdıyor, Milliyet.com.tr [http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/02/21/dunya/adun.html]. 

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] The Catalans, however, have been recognized to have all necessary characteristics of the nation: common language, history, territory, religion, history [Richard W. Mansbach, Kirsten L. Taylor, Introduction to Global Politics, Second Edition, London−New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2012, 434]. 

[29] On this issue, see in [Vladislav B. Sotirović, “Emigration, Refugees and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia 1991–2001 in the Context of Transforming Ethnographical Borders into National-State Borders”, Dalia Kuizinienė (ed.) Beginnings and Ends of Emigration: Life without Borders in Contemporary World, A collection of scholarly essays issued by Vytautas Magnus University and The Lithuanian Emigration Institute, Kaunas: Versus Aureus, 2005, 85–108].

[30] Akın Özçer, Çoğul İspanya, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2006, 71−75.

[31] The economic issue of independence is also playing the crucial role in the case of those Scotts who do not support Scotland’s political independence from the UK.

[32] This syndrome was mostly visible in the case of the Kosovo War 1998−1999 when a terrorist Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army did everything in order to provoke Serbia’s security forces to accept violence as a part of the game [Др Радослав Ђ. Гаћиновић, Насиље у Југославији, Београд: Евро, 2002, 289−305]. The rest of the story was in the hands of the Western corporate mass media and the US/EU’s diplomacy of gangsterism.   

[33] However, if such argument would prevail in those Yugoslav separatist republics and province of Kosovo, Yugoslavia will never be destroyed.

[34] Katalan Ulusu Tanındı, Evrensel.net [http://www.evrensel.net/06/04/01/dunya.html]. 

[35] On the Austrian-Hungarian compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867, see in [Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526−1918, Second and corrected Edition, Barkley−Los Angeles−London: 1977].

Featured image: A Catalan independence protest in July 2010 (CC BY-SA 2.0)

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