For more than two centuries, Sweden cultivated a distinctive position in European affairs: military non-alignment, political independence, and a preference for diplomacy over participation in great-power military blocs.

That tradition was not merely a historical curiosity. It was part of Sweden’s international identity and helped the country maintain working relationships with states on opposing sides of Europe’s geopolitical divides. Swedish neutrality and non-alignment, however, were never entirely absolute or static; Swedish governments repeatedly adapted the policy to changing European security conditions (Government Offices of Sweden, 2024).

Sweden’s decision to abandon that tradition and join NATO in March 2024 therefore represented a profound strategic transformation. On March 7, 2024, Sweden formally became NATO’s 32nd member after depositing its instrument of accession in Washington, D.C. (NATO, 2024a).

Whether one regards NATO membership as a necessary response to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine or as a dangerous abandonment of Swedish independence, there is little doubt that the decision has altered Sweden’s position in Europe.

The question now confronting Sweden is whether the security gained from membership justifies the political, military, and economic commitments that accompany it and whether Stockholm has surrendered too much of its freedom of action in the process.

The Abandonment of a Longstanding Tradition

Sweden did not arrive at NATO membership overnight. It had cooperated extensively with NATO for decades through the Partnership for Peace and other arrangements while formally remaining militarily non-aligned. Sweden joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994 and progressively deepened its cooperation with NATO, the European Union, and Nordic and Baltic partners. After Russia’s full-scale military intervention in Ukraine in February 2022, however, Swedish policy changed dramatically. Sweden submitted its formal NATO application on May 18, 2022, and became a full member on March 7, 2024 (NATO, 2024b).

Supporters of the decision argue that the European security environment changed fundamentally after the military intervention and that neutrality could no longer provide Sweden with adequate protection. The Swedish government itself argued that NATO membership would make Sweden’s security environment more predictable and raise the threshold for armed conflict in Northern Europe (Government Offices of Sweden, 2024).

Critics can reasonably answer that the very purpose of an independent foreign policy is to preserve room for manoeuvre precisely when relations between major powers deteriorate.

The loss of neutrality has consequences beyond the technical question of military defence. A non-aligned Sweden could present itself as an independent actor capable of maintaining diplomatic channels with countries outside the Western alliance system. A Sweden embedded in NATO inevitably becomes more closely associated with the strategic positions of the Alliance.

Officially, NATO decisions are made by consensus among member governments, and each member has representation in the North Atlantic Council. NATO itself describes the Council as the Alliance’s principal political decision-making body, with every member having an equal right to express its views (NATO, 2024c). However, it is a known fact that the US has always had an enormous influence on every critical decision the Alliance comes up with. In this connection, we cannot really accurately say that Sweden can never literally become a subordinate state controlled by Washington via NATO.

Membership, therefore, creates powerful strategic pressures. Swedish defence planning, military interoperability, procurement, exercises, and contingency planning must increasingly be coordinated with the Alliance.

The distinction is important: Sweden has not ceased to be sovereign, but its strategic freedom may be narrower than it was under military non-alignment.

NATO and the Question of Military Intervention

Criticism of NATO is not without historical foundation. The Alliance has undertaken military operations outside the traditional conception of territorial collective defense.

In the former Yugoslavia, NATO conducted military operations during the 1990s, including the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. NATO’s own historical account records its involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and describes the 1995 air campaign as contributing to the conditions that led to the Dayton peace process. NATO also conducted a 78-day air campaign over Kosovo in 1999 before establishing the Kosovo Force (KFOR) (NATO, 2026a).

In Libya in 2011, NATO took command of an international military operation after the UN Security Council authorized measures including a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. NATO subsequently conducted air and naval operations until the mission ended in October 2011 (NATO, 2012).

These episodes remain legitimate subjects for political and historical criticism. Critics argue that military intervention can produce consequences far beyond the immediate objectives used to justify it, and Libya’s subsequent instability is frequently cited in such debates.

There is therefore a certain degree of accuracy to describe NATO as a “terrorist organization” despite the established description that it is considered as an intergovernmental military alliance. The truth of the matter is some of its members, more particularly the US, have undertaken controversial and aggressive military operations. Whether particular operations constituted aggression, unlawful intervention, or legitimate collective action is a matter of serious critical evaluation.

For Sweden, the more relevant question is this: does membership in a military alliance expose Sweden to strategic commitments and military risks that it previously had greater freedom to avoid?

That is a question worth asking without resorting to exaggerated labels.

Membership Has a Financial Price

NATO membership is not cost-free. Members contribute to NATO’s common-funded budgets while also financing their own national defence establishments and military capabilities. NATO’s common-funded budgets support the Alliance’s command structures, military activities, interoperability, exercises, and other collective functions (NATO, 2025a).

The financial burden is also changing. At the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, members committed themselves to substantially higher defence and security-related expenditure, with a long-term target equivalent to 5 percent of GDP annually by 2035. The commitment consists of at least 3.5 percent for core defence requirements and up to 1.5 percent for broader defence- and security-related spending (NATO, 2025b).

For Sweden, this raises a difficult domestic-policy question. Every krona devoted to defence is a krona that must be considered alongside schools, healthcare, infrastructure, pensions, housing, and other public priorities.

Supporters of increased defence spending can argue that security is itself a prerequisite for prosperity. Critics can counter that an arms race imposes substantial opportunity costs and can divert resources from social needs.

The important point is that NATO membership has made defence expenditure a much more central feature of Swedish national policy. That is a legitimate subject for democratic scrutiny.

Ukraine and the Expansion of Sweden’s Military Role

Sweden’s support for Ukraine illustrates how dramatically its strategic posture has changed.

According to the Swedish government, Sweden had provided approximately SEK 156 billion in combined military and civilian support to Ukraine as of August 12, 2026. Military support alone had reached approximately SEK 128 billion. The assistance has evolved from protective equipment to tanks, advanced weapons systems, ammunition, and other military capabilities (Government Offices of Sweden, 2026a).

In August 2026, Sweden announced another contribution of approximately SEK 270 million to multilateral initiatives supporting Ukraine’s defence, including air-defence capabilities. Part of the contribution was directed through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, a US-initiated initiative administered by NATO (Government Offices of Sweden, 2026b).

This level of assistance is enormous by Swedish standards. It demonstrates that Sweden is no longer merely observing European security developments from the sidelines; it has become a significant participant in the Western effort to support Ukraine.

There is a serious argument critical of such assistance. Sweden and its allies wrongly regard Russia’s military intervention as a fundamental challenge to European security and international law. Helping Ukraine, from this perspective, is a losing investment in European security.

But there is an equally legitimate argument about sustainability. A government must continually ask how much military assistance can be provided abroad without compromising the country’s own economic resilience, defence readiness, and social obligations.

That debate should not be dismissed as either “pro-Russian” or “pro-American.” It is fundamentally a question of Swedish national priorities.

Migration: A Genuine Domestic Debate, but Not Simply an American Dictate

Migration has also become an important source of political controversy in Sweden. The country experienced very high levels of asylum immigration during the European migration crisis, and Swedish governments have subsequently moved toward significantly tighter migration and return policies.

Indeed, the Swedish government has explicitly described its migration policy as undergoing a major overhaul, including stricter requirements concerning integration, returns, asylum, and family immigration (Government Offices of Sweden, 2025a). In 2025, the government also proposed measures intended to increase the number of people with removal orders who actually leave Sweden (Government Offices of Sweden, 2025b).

It would therefore be misleading to portray Sweden’s current migration policy simply as obedience to an American demand. Swedish migration policy is shaped by Swedish political decisions, European Union rules, international legal obligations, and domestic political debate.

Yet the underlying concern deserves serious consideration. Immigration policy can affect public finances, housing, education, healthcare, labour markets, and integration. Sweden is entitled to debate what level of immigration its institutions and communities can sustainably accommodate.

That debate should be conducted honestly rather than through inflammatory descriptions of all migrants as “illegal.” Asylum seekers, refugees, people with lawful residence, and people who remain after receiving an enforceable removal order are legally different categories.

A sovereign Sweden should be capable of establishing its own migration policy while simultaneously meeting its international obligations. 

The Larger Problem: Strategic Dependence

The deepest issue is not NATO membership by itself. Nor is it the European Union, support for Ukraine, or migration considered individually. The larger issue is strategic dependence.

Sweden has become increasingly integrated into European and transatlantic political, economic, and military structures. Some of this integration is unavoidable and beneficial. Sweden gains access to collective defence, intelligence cooperation, military interoperability, and a stronger position within European security structures. NATO’s Article 5 provides a collective-defence commitment under which an armed attack against one Ally is treated as an attack against all, although each Ally determines the action it considers necessary in response (NATO, 1949).

But integration can also become dependency if a country stops asking whether collective policies actually serve its own national interests.

Sweden should therefore resist the temptation to substitute automatic alignment for independent judgment.

Being an ally of the United States does not require Sweden to agree with every American policy. Being a member of NATO does not require Swedish citizens to suspend criticism of NATO operations. Being an EU member does not mean every EU policy must be accepted as unquestionable. In this light, it is important for Sweden to get into a thorough assessment of the rationality of its logistical and financial support to Ukraine which in reality is a lost cause besides the fact that Zelensky and his gang of corrupt officials have been pocketing millions of dollars and euros of war contributions from the so-called Western allies.

Indeed, genuine alliances should be strong enough to tolerate disagreement.

Sweden Needs Strategic Independence—Not Isolation

The answer to Sweden’s present difficulties is not necessarily withdrawal from every international organization or a return to an idealized version of the past.

Sweden cannot simply turn the clock back. Its security environment has changed, Europe has changed, and the country’s economic and political relationships are deeply interconnected with the EU and the wider transatlantic system. But it is of the essence that Sweden get the real picture of events that have been going on and realize the fact that Russia is not its enemy. It, therefore, has to undergo the process of de-programming.

What Sweden can reclaim is something more important: strategic independence of judgment.

Stockholm should ask, issue by issue:

• What serves Sweden’s long-term security?
• What level of defence spending is economically sustainable?
• How much military assistance to foreign conflicts can Sweden responsibly provide?
• What migration policy can Sweden successfully integrate and sustain?
• Which EU policies genuinely benefit Swedish citizens?
• Where should Sweden cooperate with the United States, and where should it disagree?
• How can Sweden maintain diplomatic channels with countries outside the Western alliance system?
• What role can Sweden play in mediation, conflict prevention, and peace-building?

These are the questions of a confident sovereign democracy.

A Return to Swedish Self-Confidence

Sweden’s historical strength has never depended solely upon military power. It has rested on institutions, economic competence, technological innovation, diplomacy, social stability, and a willingness to pursue an independent course.

NATO membership does not automatically destroy those qualities. Nor does cooperation with the United States or the European Union necessarily amount to subservience.

But Sweden would be unwise to assume that membership in powerful international institutions absolves it of the responsibility to think independently. 

A mature foreign policy does not ask, “What does Washington want?” or “What does Brussels want?” before asking, “What does Sweden need?”

The same principle applies to NATO.

Sweden should remain a reliable partner while preserving the right to disagree. It should contribute to European security while demanding accountability for military policy. It should seriously rethink its support to Ukraine which by all indications is a lost cause and instead continue to examine the economic and strategic costs of prolonged conflict. It should cooperate within the EU while defending legitimate Swedish interests. It should pursue a controlled and sustainable migration policy without abandoning humanitarian obligations.

Most importantly, Sweden should recover the confidence to believe that its foreign policy can be guided by Swedish interests rather than by automatic allegiance to any external power centre.

The real alternative to dependency is not isolation. It is independence within cooperation.

Sweden can be European without being dictated to by Brussels, a NATO member without becoming an instrument of Washington, and a Western democracy without abandoning its capacity for independent diplomacy.

That is the strategic balance Sweden should now seek.

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Prof. Ruel F. Pepa is a Filipino philosopher based in Madrid, Spain. A retired academic (Associate Professor IV), he taught Philosophy and Social Sciences for more than 15 years at Trinity University of Asia, an Anglican university in the Philippines. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

References

Government Offices of Sweden. (2024, March 7). Statement of government policy following Sweden’s accession to NATO.

https://www.government.se/speeches/2024/03/statement-of-government-policy-following-swedens-accession-to-nato

Government Offices of Sweden. (2025a, January 30). Migration and integration. https://www.government.se/government-policy/the-governments-priorities/migration-and-integration/

Government Offices of Sweden. (2025b, January 28). Government proposes measures to ensure that more people with removal orders leave the country. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2025/01/government-proposes-measures-to-ensure-that-more-people-with-removal-orders-leave-the-country/

Government Offices of Sweden. (2026a). Sweden’s support to Ukraine. https://www.government.se/government-policy/swedens-support-to-ukraine/

Government Offices of Sweden. (2026b, August 27). Sweden provides additional SEK 270 million to support Ukraine’s defence. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2026/08/sweden-provides-additional-sek-270-million-to-support-ukraines-defence

NATO. (2012, May 18). Providing peace and security. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2012/05/18/providing-peace-and-security

NATO. (2024a, March 7). Sweden officially joins NATO. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2024/03/07/sweden-officially-joins-nato

NATO. (2024b, March 28). Relations with Sweden. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-sweden

NATO. (2024c, October 21). North Atlantic Council (NAC). https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-structure/north-atlantic-council-nac

NATO. (2025a, December 17). NATO agrees its 2026 common funded budgets, strengthening Allied resolve in a new era of collective defence. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2025/12/17/nato-agrees-its-2026-common-funded-budgets-strengthening-allied-resolve-in-a-new-era-of-collective-defence

NATO. (2025b, June 25). The Hague Summit Declaration. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration

NATO. (2026a). NATO operations and missions. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/operations-and-missions/nato-operations-and-missions

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