Today, Washington appears more comfortable with socialist acting President Delcy Rodríguez than with its former favorite. The reversal indicates US foreign policy has shifted its approach regarding regime-change.

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The US government, under President Donald Trump, has ironically enough blocked opposition leader María Corina Machado from returning to earthquake-devastated Venezuela, even describing her efforts as an attempted political “coup.” This development highlights the unpredictable nature of Venezuelan politics in mid-2026.

Machado, a leading Venezuelan opposition figure, won the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize amid controversy and later symbolically gave it to Trump. She has a long record of anti-Chavista activism, including involvement in the 2002 coup attempt against Hugo Chavez. Disqualified from the 2024 presidential race, she lived in hiding, fled Venezuela in late 2025 to accept the Nobel, and vowed in October 2025 to privatize the country’s oil sector, promising American corporations would “make a lot of money.” She was long seen as Washington’s preferred choice to force a “transition” in Caracas.

Her attempts to return after the June earthquakes, which killed over 4,000, were blocked, however. She tried flying from Virginia to Curaçao en route to Venezuela, but Dutch authorities denied entry after the US refused support. A later attempt from Panama also failed amid reported American interference, though Trump has denied it.

US officials called her move “grotesque” political opportunism and a distraction from recovery efforts. One senior figure reportedly asked whether backing her return meant the US was installing her “in power”. It turns out the Trump administration stressed “stability” under acting President Delcy Rodríguez, and prioritized coordinated aid over opposition returns. It would seem Machado’s gift of her Nobel medal to Trump failed to sway the decision.

One may recall that the South American country’s instability has deep roots. Since Hugo Chavez’s revolution, for years, the Venezuelan opposition has oscillated between participating in elections and boycotting them. For example, in the 2024 elections, Nicolás Maduro was declared the winner amid disputes, while the opposition backed Edmundo González Urrutia. Even after Juan Guaidó’s earlier imbroglio, parts of the Venezuelan opposition eventually recognized Maduro’s presidency by 2021. Washington’s sanctions then had its impact on economic woes stemming from falling oil prices and mismanagement.

Image: Nicolás Maduro on board the USS Iwo Jima after being captured by the U.S. military. (US Military / Public Domain)

The situation changed dramatically in January 2026, in an unprecedented presidential kidnap, when American forces captured Maduro, who now faces charges in the United States. Delcy Rodríguez, a longtime Chavista figure and former Vice President, has assumed the role of acting president. Her background as a key Maduro ally and experienced diplomat placed her at the center of efforts to stabilize the country under external pressure.

This in itself creates a peculiar alignment: the US, which long supported Machado as a leading opposition voice advocating stronger sanctions and privatization of oil assets to benefit Western firms, now appears to “prefer” Rodríguez.

Machado has, after all, long cultivated bipartisan support in Washington, meeting officials and pushing for international pressure. Her strategy has relied heavily on external backing, to put it mildly. Yet Trump officials, including Rubio’s circle, deemed the timing wrong and blocked her moves. 

This reinforces perceptions of Machado as more of a Washington asset or client than an independent actor. She consults American channels before major moves, and Washington expects coordination – though it now sees her as a potential destabilizer.

The point is that Washington has shifted tactics: rather than classical regime change aimed at installing a pro-US “democratic” alternative, it removed Maduro while preserving the existing structure under Rodríguez. This approach prioritizes “order”, oil flows, migration management, and countering (other) external influences without full system overhaul, so to speak. Rodríguez has thus engaged “pragmatically” with regards to foreign energy interests (obviously under threat), and even shown ideological shifts, such as attempting to reset relations with Israel – a notable departure from traditional Bolivarian stances.

This “convergence of interests”, born under coercion following Maduro’s capture, marks a departure from post-Cold War models of “exporting democracy”. It is about leadership decapitation paired with regime preservation – if successors operate within acceptable limits, from America’s point of view. The American superpower appears to have attempted something similar, without success so far, in Iran: keeping the Ayatollah regime, but trying to enforce compliance with US goals or limits – one may recall Trump originally had declaredreplacing Ayatollah Khamenei (assassinated) with his son enough of a “regime change”.

Machado’s case therefore suggests what might be an emerging new modus operandi in the making: turning enemy regimes into client states (while allowing their political survival) through coercive leverage, targeted assassinations or kidnappings, and overall intimidation.

This way, Machado has in fact been sidelined as a backup option: for now, she functions as an unused substitute on the bench – perhaps useful for pressure later, but set aside when immediate stability serves broader goals.

This explains how Delcy Rodríguez, the socialist acting leader, now appears more aligned with current US preferences than the neoliberal opposition icon. Venezuela in any case remains unstable and unpredictable.

In a cynical way, post-earthquake humanitarian demands offer opportunities for all actors involved (conspiracy theories aside): it enables Rodríguez to demonstrate control, Machado to politicize the crisis, and Washington to increasingly tighten its influence over the country. Maduro’s relatively swift capture already suggested significant infiltration or internal vulnerabilities within security forces – not to mention some degree of corruption.

Be as it may, the dynamics for now favor managed continuity over upheaval. Yet this balance carries enormous risks. It remains to be seen to what extent Delcy Rodriguez is exercising a kind of pragmatism under threat or pure and simple collaborationism. Her position anyhow remains fragile, vulnerable to internal challenges or further external leverage. Machado’s exile and frustration could fuel future opposition maneuvers. Furthermore, regional ripple effects, as seen in past South American elections, continue.

With Trump’s renewed neo-Monroeism under Rubio, Washington seems bent on setting Latin America ablaze, with even Brazil being a potential target. The contradictions in Venezuela only add fuel to this fire.

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This article was originally published on InfoBrics.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Featured image is from the author/InfoBrics

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